CyberMed

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Secure medical-device software development lifecycle diagram
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Complete diagram

Complete lifecycle, 27 steps

Interactive lifecycle explorer

Secure medical-device software development, step by step

Follow the complete CyberMed lifecycle from user needs through design validation. Each step connects IEC 62304 software processes with ANSI/AAMI SW96 security risk management and FDA's 2026 cybersecurity guidance.

How to use this explorer

Scroll to focus each box in the original diagram. The full lifecycle stays visible so you can follow feedback loops, verification paths, and risk decisions. Every step has a direct URL fragment.

Step 1 of 27Context and requirements

User Needs

User needs state what people and care settings need the medical device to achieve safely and securely.

What it is

A concise set of intended-use, user, clinical, environmental, and security needs that gives the development team a common problem definition.

Why it exists

Clear needs keep later requirements and validation tied to real users, use environments, and reasonably foreseeable misuse.

Main inputs

  • Intended use and indications
  • User and patient research
  • Clinical workflow
  • Expected use environments
  • Known safety and cybersecurity concerns

Key activities

  • Describe users, patients, and operating environments
  • Capture desired clinical and operational outcomes
  • Include security and updateability needs
  • Identify foreseeable misuse and environmental constraints

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Approved user-needs specification
  • Use-environment assumptions
  • Trace links to system requirements
  • Initial misuse and security concerns

Participating roles

Product owner, Clinical lead, Systems engineer, Human factors specialist, Cybersecurity lead

Lifecycle connection

User needs drive system requirements. Design validation later checks whether the finished device satisfies these needs in its intended use.

The secure development lifecycle
Step 2 of 27Context and requirements

System Requirements

System requirements translate user needs into measurable requirements for the complete medical device system.

What it is

The controlled set of functional, performance, safety, security, interface, environmental, and regulatory requirements for the full system.

Why it exists

Software requirements need a stable system context. Cybersecurity also depends on hardware, networks, cloud services, users, and related systems.

Main inputs

  • Approved user needs
  • System concept and architecture
  • Risk analyses
  • Regulatory and standards inputs
  • External interface constraints

Key activities

  • Define measurable system behavior
  • Allocate functions and controls to system elements
  • Specify interfaces and operating constraints
  • Establish verification methods and traceability

Expected outputs and evidence

  • System requirements specification
  • Allocation records
  • Interface requirements
  • Requirements traceability

Participating roles

Systems engineer, Product owner, Safety risk manager, Cybersecurity lead, Software and hardware leads

Lifecycle connection

System requirements come from user needs and allocate the software contribution that becomes software requirements. Design verification later checks the system design against them.

Documentation and traceability
Step 3 of 27Context and requirements

Software Requirements

Software requirements define what the software must do, including the controls needed for safety and cybersecurity risk.

What it is

A verifiable specification for software functions, interfaces, data, performance, alarms, security, configuration, and risk controls.

Why it exists

Requirements create the traceable basis for architecture, implementation, verification, and change analysis.

Main inputs

  • Allocated system requirements
  • Safety and security risk controls
  • System architecture and interfaces
  • SOUP and platform constraints
  • Applicable regulatory inputs

Key activities

  • Define functional and nonfunctional software behavior
  • Include software risk-control requirements
  • Specify interfaces, data, and security objectives
  • Review requirements for clarity, consistency, testability, and traceability

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Software requirements specification
  • Security requirements
  • Traceability matrix
  • Requirements review record

Participating roles

Software lead, Systems engineer, Cybersecurity lead, Safety risk manager, Verification lead

Lifecycle connection

Software requirements are allocated from the system and feed software architecture. Risk loops return here when new or revised controls must become requirements.

The secure development lifecycle
Step 4 of 27Architecture cybersecurity

Software Architecture

Software architecture turns software requirements into a documented structure of software items and interfaces.

What it is

The top-level software structure, key software items, interfaces, responsibilities, dependencies, and segregation used to realize the requirements.

Why it exists

Architecture makes the system understandable enough to control complexity, isolate risk, plan integration, and verify design decisions.

Main inputs

  • Software requirements
  • System architecture
  • Safety and security risk controls
  • SOUP constraints
  • Platform and interface information

Key activities

  • Decompose software into items and interfaces
  • Define data flows and communication protocols
  • Specify SOUP needs and platform dependencies
  • Establish segregation needed for risk control
  • Verify the architecture against its inputs

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Software architecture document
  • Interface definitions
  • Segregation rationale
  • Architecture verification record

Participating roles

Software architect, Systems engineer, Cybersecurity architect, Software lead, Verification lead

Lifecycle connection

Software architecture follows software requirements and feeds both detailed software design and the security-architecture analysis shown in the left branch.

The secure development lifecycle
Step 5 of 27Architecture cybersecurity

Architecture with Security Views

Security views expose trust boundaries, assets, data flows, update paths, and control placement within the device system.

What it is

A set of security-focused representations of the system architecture, supported by explanatory text and traceable security claims.

Why it exists

General architecture diagrams often hide the details needed to analyze attack paths, shared dependencies, and end-to-end protection.

Main inputs

  • System and software architecture
  • Interface inventory
  • Asset inventory
  • Security requirements
  • Operating-environment assumptions

Key activities

  • Map security domains and trust boundaries
  • Trace data, code, commands, and update flows
  • Show authentication, authorization, and session behavior
  • Locate controls and supporting evidence
  • Review views with development and risk teams

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Global system view
  • Multi-patient harm view
  • Updateability and patchability view
  • Security use-case views
  • Trust-boundary and data-flow diagrams

Participating roles

Cybersecurity architect, Systems architect, Software architect, Risk manager, Verification lead

Lifecycle connection

These views refine the software architecture for threat modeling. Findings can send new requirements or controls back into the main development path.

Documentation and traceability
Step 6 of 27Architecture cybersecurity

Threat Modeling

Threat modeling uses the architecture to identify assets, attack paths, threats, vulnerabilities, and candidate controls.

What it is

A repeatable analysis of how a capable threat actor could compromise the device, its related systems, or the clinical environment.

Why it exists

Threat modeling finds design weaknesses early and turns abstract security objectives into concrete risks and requirements.

Main inputs

  • Security architecture views
  • Intended use and foreseeable misuse
  • Asset and interface inventory
  • Threat intelligence
  • Known platform and supply-chain weaknesses

Key activities

  • Define scope and system boundaries
  • Identify assets, threat actors, and attack surfaces
  • Analyze abuse cases and attack paths
  • Record threats and potential vulnerabilities
  • Propose controls and trace findings into risk management

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Threat-model report
  • Data-flow diagrams
  • Threat and attack-path register
  • Assumptions and scope record
  • Trace links to risks and controls

Participating roles

Threat-model facilitator, Cybersecurity engineer, Software and systems architects, Clinical or domain expert, Risk manager

Lifecycle connection

Threat modeling consumes the security views and produces risk scenarios for estimation and evaluation. It is updated when design or threat information changes.

The secure development lifecycle
Step 7 of 27Architecture cybersecurity

Estimate and Evaluate Architecture Risk

The team estimates each architecture-level security risk and evaluates it against documented acceptability criteria.

What it is

A security risk assessment that connects threats and vulnerabilities to exploitability, adverse impact, safety impact, and existing controls.

Why it exists

A consistent evaluation shows which design risks need control and provides a traceable basis for engineering decisions.

Main inputs

  • Threat-model findings
  • Asset and vulnerability information
  • Security risk acceptability criteria
  • Safety risk analysis
  • Existing architecture controls

Key activities

  • Describe credible threat scenarios
  • Estimate exploitability and adverse impact
  • Evaluate potential safety impact
  • Apply approved risk criteria
  • Record uncertainty and supporting rationale

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Cybersecurity risk assessment
  • Risk-estimation rationale
  • Safety-risk handoff where applicable
  • Traceability to threats and architecture

Participating roles

Security risk manager, Cybersecurity engineer, Safety risk manager, Systems architect, Clinical expert

Lifecycle connection

The assessment turns threat-model findings into an acceptability decision. Unacceptable risks move to control selection; acceptable risks remain documented residual risks.

Documentation and traceability
Step 8 of 27Architecture cybersecurity

Is the Architecture Risk Acceptable?

A documented decision compares architecture risk with the criteria in the security risk management plan.

What it is

A formal evaluation point that either accepts the estimated residual risk or triggers further security risk control work.

Why it exists

Explicit criteria prevent risk decisions from becoming informal opinions and preserve the reason for each control or acceptance.

Main inputs

  • Estimated architecture risk
  • Approved acceptability criteria
  • Potential safety impact
  • Existing control effectiveness
  • Known uncertainty

Key activities

  • Compare each risk with the approved criteria
  • Document the decision and rationale
  • Escalate safety-related risk as needed
  • Identify additional control work for unacceptable risk

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Risk-evaluation record
  • Approval or review record
  • Residual-risk entry
  • Control action for each unacceptable risk

Participating roles

Security risk manager, Design authority, Safety risk manager, Product security lead, Quality representative

Lifecycle connection

A yes path permits detailed software design to proceed with documented residual risk. A no path leads to cybersecurity controls and revised requirements or architecture.

Common development pitfalls
Step 9 of 27Architecture cybersecurity

Cybersecurity Controls

Cybersecurity controls reduce unacceptable security risk through secure design, protective measures, and user-facing information.

What it is

Selected technical and procedural measures mapped to specific threats, vulnerabilities, security objectives, and risk-control requirements.

Why it exists

Controls provide the engineered response to unacceptable risk and create claims that later verification and security testing must support.

Main inputs

  • Unacceptable security risks
  • Security objectives
  • Architecture constraints
  • State-of-the-art control options
  • Use-environment assumptions

Key activities

  • Select controls in the required priority order
  • Define control requirements and architecture placement
  • Analyze new risks introduced by controls
  • Plan implementation and effectiveness verification
  • Update risk traceability

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Security control specification
  • Control-selection rationale
  • Updated requirements and architecture
  • Implementation and verification plan
  • Risk-control traceability

Participating roles

Cybersecurity architect, Security risk manager, Software and systems architects, Product owner, Verification lead

Lifecycle connection

Selected controls loop back into software requirements and architecture. The design and test paths then implement and verify them.

The secure development lifecycle
Step 10 of 27Design and implementation

Software Design

Software design refines the architecture into software units, interfaces, algorithms, data structures, and detailed behavior.

What it is

The detailed design information needed to implement each software unit and its interfaces correctly and consistently.

Why it exists

A reviewable design reduces ambiguity, makes risk controls concrete, and gives implementation and unit verification a stable basis.

Main inputs

  • Verified software architecture
  • Software requirements
  • Security control specifications
  • Coding standards
  • SOUP and platform constraints

Key activities

  • Refine software items into units
  • Define unit behavior and interfaces
  • Specify control logic and error handling
  • Apply secure design principles
  • Verify the design against architecture and requirements

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Software detailed-design specification
  • Interface specifications
  • Design review and verification record
  • Traceability to requirements and controls

Participating roles

Software designer, Software architect, Cybersecurity engineer, Software lead, Verification reviewer

Lifecycle connection

Software design follows architecture and provides the blueprint for implementation. Risk loops may return here when testing or analysis exposes a design weakness.

Secure coding practices
Step 11 of 27Design and implementation

Software Implementation and Integration

Developers implement the designed software units and assemble them into controlled software builds.

What it is

Coding, review, configuration control, build, and integration work that creates the executable software system from the approved design.

Why it exists

Disciplined implementation prevents avoidable defects and preserves the evidence needed to reproduce, review, and test each build.

Main inputs

  • Verified detailed design
  • Software requirements
  • Secure coding standards
  • Approved tools and build environment
  • Third-party components

Key activities

  • Implement each software unit
  • Apply secure coding and review practices
  • Control source, dependencies, and build configuration
  • Integrate units according to the plan
  • Record problems and approved changes

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Controlled source code
  • Code-review records
  • Build and configuration records
  • Integrated software baseline
  • Problem and change records

Participating roles

Software developers, Software lead, Build or DevSecOps engineer, Cybersecurity engineer, Configuration manager

Lifecycle connection

Implementation follows detailed design. Its outputs feed unit testing, integration testing, code analysis, and SBOM generation.

Secure coding practices
Step 12 of 27Design and implementation

Generate the SBOM

The software bill of materials records the software components and dependencies present in the device build.

What it is

A controlled inventory of proprietary, commercial, open-source, and off-the-shelf software components and their relationships.

Why it exists

The SBOM supports supply-chain transparency, vulnerability impact analysis, release review, and postmarket monitoring.

Main inputs

  • Integrated software build
  • Dependency manifests and lockfiles
  • Build-system output
  • SOUP and supplier records
  • Component identifiers and versions

Key activities

  • Enumerate first-party and third-party components
  • Normalize names, versions, suppliers, and identifiers
  • Record dependency relationships and support status
  • Reconcile the SBOM with the released build
  • Place the SBOM under configuration control

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Machine-readable SBOM
  • SBOM review record
  • Component-to-build reconciliation
  • Supplier and support information
  • Configuration baseline

Participating roles

Software and build engineers, Supply-chain or supplier quality lead, Cybersecurity engineer, Configuration manager, Regulatory lead

Lifecycle connection

The integrated build produces the SBOM. Component risk evaluation may send changes back to design, dependency selection, or implementation.

Third-party component management
Step 13 of 27Design and implementation

Estimate and Evaluate Component Risk

The team evaluates component vulnerabilities, support status, exposure, and potential device impact.

What it is

A build-specific assessment of security risk introduced by proprietary and third-party software components in the SBOM.

Why it exists

A component inventory becomes useful when it supports decisions about vulnerable, unsupported, or unnecessary software.

Main inputs

  • Build-specific SBOM
  • Known-vulnerability data
  • Supplier advisories
  • Threat model and architecture
  • Component reachability and privileges

Key activities

  • Identify known and reasonably foreseeable component weaknesses
  • Assess exploitability in the device context
  • Evaluate safety and security impact
  • Review support and end-of-support dates
  • Document proposed treatment

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Component vulnerability assessment
  • Reachability or applicability rationale
  • Supplier evidence
  • Risk records linked to SBOM entries
  • Treatment decisions

Participating roles

Product security engineer, Software composition analysis owner, Software architect, Supplier quality lead, Security risk manager

Lifecycle connection

Component risk assessment follows SBOM generation and leads to an acceptability decision. New component information can restart this loop at any time.

Third-party component management
Step 14 of 27Design and implementation

Is the Component Risk Acceptable?

A controlled decision determines whether identified component risk can remain in the build.

What it is

The evaluation point for accepting, replacing, updating, removing, isolating, or otherwise controlling a component-related risk.

Why it exists

The decision ties component use to documented risk criteria and keeps vulnerable or unsupported software from entering a release by default.

Main inputs

  • Component risk assessment
  • Risk acceptability criteria
  • Architecture and compensating controls
  • Supplier remediation information
  • Clinical and availability constraints

Key activities

  • Apply approved risk criteria
  • Review available remediation options
  • Document residual risk and rationale
  • Create design or implementation work for unacceptable risk
  • Set monitoring conditions where needed

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Component risk decision
  • Approved exception or remediation action
  • Updated risk-control traceability
  • Monitoring or support commitment

Participating roles

Security risk manager, Software architect, Product security lead, Quality representative, Product owner

Lifecycle connection

An acceptable result permits unit verification to continue. An unacceptable result returns to design, component selection, or implementation before the build advances.

Third-party component management
Step 15 of 27Verification and validation

Software Unit Testing

Unit verification checks each software unit against defined acceptance criteria before or during integration.

What it is

Risk-based review, analysis, and testing of individual software units, including their expected behavior, interfaces, error handling, and coding quality.

Why it exists

Defects are less costly to diagnose at unit level, and critical control logic needs direct evidence before higher-level tests obscure the cause.

Main inputs

  • Implemented software units
  • Detailed design
  • Unit acceptance criteria
  • Coding standards
  • Risk-control requirements

Key activities

  • Define and review unit-verification methods
  • Test normal, boundary, and error behavior
  • Review code against acceptance criteria
  • Verify unit-level security controls
  • Record and resolve anomalies

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Unit test procedures and results
  • Coverage or analysis records where justified
  • Code-review results
  • Anomaly and resolution records
  • Traceability to design and controls

Participating roles

Software developers, Unit-test engineer, Software lead, Cybersecurity reviewer, Independent reviewer where required by procedure

Lifecycle connection

Unit testing verifies implementation against detailed design. Results support integration and are complemented by static and dynamic security analysis.

Security testing approaches
Step 16 of 27Verification and validation

SAST and DAST

Static and dynamic analysis look for implementation weaknesses that functional testing may not expose.

What it is

Automated and manual analysis of source or binaries at rest, plus testing of running software through its exposed interfaces and behaviors.

Why it exists

Different techniques find different defect classes. Combined results give broader evidence about implementation quality and attack surface.

Main inputs

  • Source code or compiled software
  • Configured test environment
  • Security requirements and threat model
  • Tool rules and versions
  • Known weakness taxonomies

Key activities

  • Configure risk-relevant rules and test scope
  • Run static and dynamic analysis
  • Triage results for applicability and severity
  • Trace confirmed weaknesses to risk and defects
  • Retest fixes and document tool limitations

Expected outputs and evidence

  • SAST and DAST reports
  • Tool configuration and version records
  • Triage rationale
  • Confirmed defect records
  • Retest evidence

Participating roles

Application security engineer, Software developer, Security tester, Software lead, Security risk manager

Lifecycle connection

Analysis complements unit testing. Confirmed weaknesses move to risk evaluation; an acceptable result supports software integration testing.

Security testing approaches
Step 17 of 27Verification and validation

Is the Analysis Risk Acceptable?

Confirmed analysis findings are evaluated before the software proceeds to higher-level integration testing.

What it is

A decision that separates false positives and acceptable residual risk from weaknesses that require design, code, or control changes.

Why it exists

A clean tool dashboard is not the goal. The team needs documented decisions for applicable weaknesses and their potential effects.

Main inputs

  • Triaged SAST and DAST findings
  • Threat and vulnerability context
  • Risk criteria
  • Control effectiveness
  • Safety impact analysis

Key activities

  • Confirm technical applicability
  • Estimate exploitability and impact
  • Apply risk criteria
  • Document false-positive and residual-risk rationale
  • Create corrective work and retest plans

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Finding disposition log
  • Risk-evaluation records
  • Approved residual-risk rationale
  • Corrective action and retest evidence

Participating roles

Application security engineer, Security risk manager, Software lead, Safety risk representative, Quality reviewer

Lifecycle connection

Acceptable findings allow integration testing to continue. Unacceptable findings return to software design or implementation for correction and re-verification.

Security testing approaches
Step 18 of 27Verification and validation

Software Integration Testing

Integration testing verifies that software units and items work together through their defined interfaces.

What it is

Planned testing of the assembled software, including interfaces, data flow, timing, control behavior, resource use, and regression effects.

Why it exists

Many failures appear only when components interact, especially at trust boundaries, error paths, and shared-resource interfaces.

Main inputs

  • Integrated software baseline
  • Architecture and interface specifications
  • Integration plan and procedures
  • Resolved unit and analysis findings
  • Risk-control requirements

Key activities

  • Integrate software according to the plan
  • Verify integration and interface behavior
  • Test normal and abnormal interactions
  • Run appropriate regression tests
  • Record results, versions, tools, and anomalies

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Integration test procedures
  • Integration and regression results
  • Configuration and tool records
  • Interface coverage
  • Problem-resolution records

Participating roles

Integration engineer, Software test engineer, Software lead, Cybersecurity tester, Configuration manager

Lifecycle connection

Integration testing follows unit-level verification and security analysis. Its evidence supports software verification against the full requirements set.

Security testing approaches
Step 19 of 27Verification and validation

Software Verification

Software verification confirms that the integrated software satisfies its software requirements and planned acceptance criteria.

What it is

The collected review, analysis, and test evidence that shows software outputs conform to documented software inputs.

Why it exists

Verification creates the objective evidence needed to support release decisions, risk-control claims, and traceability completeness.

Main inputs

  • Verified software requirements
  • Integrated software baseline
  • Software verification plan
  • Unit and integration evidence
  • Risk-control traceability

Key activities

  • Execute software-system tests
  • Confirm tests trace to requirements
  • Evaluate all results against acceptance criteria
  • Retest after changes
  • Resolve or document anomalies

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Software verification report
  • Software-system test results
  • Requirements coverage matrix
  • Risk-control verification evidence
  • Anomaly records

Participating roles

Software verification lead, Test engineers, Software lead, Cybersecurity tester, Quality representative

Lifecycle connection

Software verification closes the software side of the V-model against software requirements. Its residual anomalies then receive a focused security assessment.

Documentation and traceability
Step 20 of 27Verification and validation

Security Assessment of Unresolved Anomalies

Known unresolved anomalies are reviewed for cybersecurity effects before the release evidence can be considered complete.

What it is

A security-focused analysis of remaining defects, deviations, unexpected behavior, and test anomalies in the release candidate.

Why it exists

An anomaly that appears minor functionally can expose an attack path, weaken a control, or combine with another condition to create risk.

Main inputs

  • Known anomaly list
  • Problem and change records
  • Threat model
  • Security architecture and controls
  • Verification results

Key activities

  • Review each unresolved anomaly for security relevance
  • Analyze exploitability and potential impact
  • Check interaction with existing threats and controls
  • Update risk records and labeling inputs
  • Define monitoring or remediation commitments

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Unresolved-anomaly security assessment
  • Risk and threat-model updates
  • Release rationale
  • Monitoring or remediation plan
  • Traceability to problem records

Participating roles

Product security lead, Software verification lead, Security risk manager, Software lead, Quality and regulatory representatives

Lifecycle connection

The assessment follows software verification. Its findings lead to an acceptability decision before cybersecurity testing and higher-level verification continue.

Documentation and traceability
Step 21 of 27Verification and validation

Is the Anomaly Risk Acceptable?

The release team decides whether the security risk from each unresolved anomaly is acceptable under the approved criteria.

What it is

A release-facing risk decision that either permits a documented anomaly to remain or sends corrective work back into requirements, design, implementation, or verification.

Why it exists

A controlled decision prevents the schedule from silently overriding security risk management.

Main inputs

  • Anomaly security assessment
  • Approved risk criteria
  • Software verification evidence
  • Potential safety impact
  • Proposed monitoring or remediation

Key activities

  • Evaluate each security-relevant anomaly
  • Confirm residual-risk rationale
  • Review cumulative and interacting effects
  • Approve corrective action where risk is unacceptable
  • Record the decision in release evidence

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Anomaly risk decision
  • Release approval input
  • Corrective action or approved residual risk
  • Updated risk-management traceability

Participating roles

Security risk manager, Software release authority, Quality representative, Product security lead, Safety risk manager

Lifecycle connection

An acceptable result opens the cybersecurity-testing branch. An unacceptable result returns to software requirements or design for corrective work and repeat verification.

Common development pitfalls
Step 22 of 27Verification and validation

Cybersecurity Testing

Cybersecurity testing challenges the integrated device system, its controls, and its exposed attack surface.

What it is

Risk-based testing that combines control verification, vulnerability testing, misuse and abuse cases, fuzzing, penetration testing, and other suitable methods.

Why it exists

Security architecture and implementation claims need evidence under realistic and adversarial conditions, not only normal functional use.

Main inputs

  • Release-candidate device system
  • Threat model and attack surface
  • Security requirements and controls
  • Architecture views
  • Known vulnerabilities and abuse cases

Key activities

  • Define risk-based scope and independence
  • Verify control implementation and effectiveness
  • Exercise misuse, abuse, and malformed-input cases
  • Perform vulnerability and penetration testing
  • Document methods, configurations, results, and limitations

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Cybersecurity test plan and report
  • Control-verification results
  • Penetration or vulnerability-test report
  • Test environment and tool records
  • Finding traceability

Participating roles

Security test lead, Penetration tester, Product security engineer, Software and systems engineers, Security risk manager

Lifecycle connection

Cybersecurity testing follows acceptable anomaly risk and challenges the integrated system. Discovered vulnerabilities feed another risk loop before design verification.

Security testing approaches
Step 23 of 27Verification and validation

Vulnerabilities Discovered

Confirmed test findings become controlled vulnerability records with ownership, context, and traceability.

What it is

The intake and normalization step for weaknesses found by testing, review, suppliers, researchers, or other lifecycle activities.

Why it exists

Findings need enough context and control to support risk analysis, correction, trend analysis, and later monitoring.

Main inputs

  • Security test findings
  • Reproduction evidence
  • Affected configurations and versions
  • Threat and architecture context
  • Supplier or tool reports

Key activities

  • Confirm and reproduce findings
  • Identify affected assets and versions
  • Record weakness, attack path, and preconditions
  • Link the finding to risk and problem resolution
  • Assign ownership and target dates

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Controlled vulnerability record
  • Reproduction steps and evidence
  • Affected-version analysis
  • Problem or change request
  • Trace links to risk and testing

Participating roles

Product security engineer, Security tester, Software lead, Configuration manager, Security risk manager

Lifecycle connection

Discovery follows cybersecurity testing and supplies the final risk-estimation loop. Confirmed weaknesses may also update the threat model and test coverage.

Documentation and traceability
Step 24 of 27Verification and validation

Estimate and Evaluate Testing Risk

The team evaluates vulnerabilities found during system-level cybersecurity testing in the device and clinical context.

What it is

A focused security risk assessment of confirmed test findings, including exploitability, adverse impact, safety impact, affected versions, and control effectiveness.

Why it exists

Test severity labels alone do not determine medical-device risk. The device architecture, use environment, and possible harm shape the decision.

Main inputs

  • Controlled vulnerability records
  • Test and reproduction evidence
  • Threat model and architecture
  • Risk criteria
  • Safety and clinical impact analysis

Key activities

  • Map each vulnerability to assets and threat scenarios
  • Estimate exploitability and adverse impact
  • Evaluate safety impact and related-system effects
  • Assess existing and proposed controls
  • Document uncertainty and rationale

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Finding-specific risk assessment
  • Safety-risk communication
  • Updated threat-model entry
  • Control and remediation proposal
  • Affected-configuration analysis

Participating roles

Security risk manager, Product security engineer, Security tester, Safety risk manager, Systems engineer

Lifecycle connection

Risk estimation converts test findings into a release decision. It may also send new controls, requirements, or tests back through the lifecycle.

Security testing approaches
Step 25 of 27Verification and validation

Is the Testing Risk Acceptable?

The final cybersecurity risk loop decides whether test findings permit the device to advance toward design verification and validation.

What it is

A release-gate decision that accepts documented residual risk or requires remediation, new controls, and repeat verification.

Why it exists

The gate makes the response to discovered vulnerabilities traceable and keeps release decisions aligned with the security risk management plan.

Main inputs

  • Finding-specific risk assessments
  • Approved acceptability criteria
  • Remediation and control options
  • Cumulative residual risk
  • Release and clinical constraints

Key activities

  • Apply risk criteria to each finding
  • Evaluate cumulative and interacting risk
  • Approve residual risk or corrective action
  • Define regression and security retesting
  • Update release-readiness evidence

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Testing risk decision
  • Approved residual-risk rationale
  • Remediation and retest plan
  • Updated security risk management report
  • Release gate record

Participating roles

Security risk manager, Release authority, Product security lead, Quality representative, Safety risk manager

Lifecycle connection

A yes path advances to design verification. A no path returns to software design and implementation, followed by all affected verification and security tests.

Secure build and release processes
Step 26 of 27Release evidence

Design Verification

Design verification confirms that system design outputs meet the approved system requirements.

What it is

The system-level reviews, analyses, and tests that show the implemented device conforms to its design inputs, including cybersecurity requirements.

Why it exists

System verification checks behavior across software, hardware, services, interfaces, and controls that software verification cannot cover alone.

Main inputs

  • System requirements
  • Integrated device system
  • System verification plan
  • Software and cybersecurity evidence
  • Risk-control traceability

Key activities

  • Execute system-level verification methods
  • Verify interfaces and related-system behavior
  • Confirm system security requirements and controls
  • Evaluate results and anomalies
  • Complete traceability and change impact

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Design verification report
  • System test and analysis records
  • Requirements coverage
  • System risk-control verification
  • Anomaly disposition

Participating roles

Systems verification lead, Systems engineer, Cybersecurity test lead, Safety risk manager, Quality representative

Lifecycle connection

Design verification follows acceptable software and cybersecurity evidence and closes the loop to system requirements. It supplies a verified device for design validation.

Documentation and traceability
Step 27 of 27Release evidence

Design Validation

Design validation confirms that the finished device meets user needs and intended-use requirements in representative conditions.

What it is

The planned evaluation of the complete device with production-equivalent units, representative users, intended environments, and applicable clinical or use scenarios.

Why it exists

A device can meet written requirements and still fail to support safe, effective, and secure use in the real environment.

Main inputs

  • Approved user needs and intended use
  • Verified device system
  • Validation plan and acceptance criteria
  • Representative users and environments
  • Residual-risk and labeling information

Key activities

  • Validate intended use and key user needs
  • Use representative conditions and production-equivalent units
  • Confirm secure configuration and operational assumptions
  • Evaluate unexpected results and use-related effects
  • Complete final traceability and approvals

Expected outputs and evidence

  • Design validation protocol and report
  • User-need coverage
  • Representative-environment evidence
  • Residual-risk and labeling confirmation
  • Final approval records

Participating roles

Validation lead, Clinical and human factors specialists, Systems engineer, Product security representative, Quality and regulatory representatives

Lifecycle connection

Design validation closes the top V-model loop to user needs. Its findings may restart any affected lifecycle activity through controlled change and risk management.

Key takeaways

Sources and how to read them

Every step cites the clause or section it relies on. Each citation has a label that tells you how much weight it carries. The diagram and the step order are CyberMed's integration of these sources. No single standard defines this lifecycle.

Published . Updated . Written and reviewed under the CyberMed editorial policy.

Source labels

Statutory requirement
A requirement in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. It is law for the submissions and devices that the statute covers.
Normative requirement
A requirement stated in the cited clause of a consensus standard. It applies when a manufacturer claims conformance to that standard. Some IEC 62304 clauses apply only to software safety Class B or Class C.
FDA guidance
A recommendation in FDA's premarket cybersecurity guidance. Guidance describes FDA's current thinking and is not binding, except where it restates a statutory or regulatory requirement.
Recommended practice
Informative material in a standard, or a common engineering practice. It is useful, but no cited source requires it.
CyberMed explanation
CyberMed's reading of how the step fits the lifecycle diagram. It is an interpretation, not a requirement from any source.

Primary documents

Continue in the book: Chapter 4, Secure Development and Testing and The Secure Development Lifecycle.

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